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17 January 1985

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible KGB Involvement in Murder of Polish Priest

The above Current Intelligence Memorandum, SOVA M-10013CX, dated 10 January 1985, was issued with an incorrect number.

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Central Intelligence Agency	25/1
Washington, D.C. 20505 10 January 1985	
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM	
SUBJECT: Possible KGB Involvement in Murder of Polish Priest	
Whatever the outcome of the trial currently in progress in Warsaw, definitive evidence clearly implicating or absolving the Soviets in the mid-October murder of human rights activist priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko by officials of the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry may never surface. This speculative memorandum examines possible disadvantages and advantages the Soviets could have seen in arranging or allowing the murder. Whether or not the KGB was actively involved in the murder of Father Popieluszko, the Soviets bear some indirect responsibility. By encouraging hardline factions in the Polish party and police to push for harsher measures against Solidarity, they helped create the climate in which such an act could occur.	25X1
Case Against Soviet Involvement	
Several arguments can be advanced against the hypothesis of Soviet complicity in the murder:	
It is not at all clear that the Soviets see any viable alternative to Jaruzelski. If they do not, they would not wish to take any action aimed at weakening his ability to rule.	25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of	25X1
Soviet Analysis. Comments or questions may be addressed to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division	25X1


SOVA M 85-10013CX

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:	Even if the Soviets wanted to remove Jaruzelski or to increase pressure on him to hew more closely to Moscow's wishes, they could not be confident that they could control developments in Poland following the murder. They might have feared that the murder would backfire, leading to an undesirable level of popular turmoil or to a strengthening of Jaruzelski's position. For example, the Soviets might have anticipated Jaruzelski would use the murder as a pretext for a lower-level housecleaning of the pro-Soviet faction of the Interior Ministry. He now appears to be trying to single out Soviet-backed Politburo member Miroslaw Milewski for negligence, setting the stage for his removal.	25X1
	The timing of the murder argues against KGB participation. At a time when the Italian Government is trying a Bulgarian for the attempt on the life of the Pope amid suspicions of KGB complicity, the Soviets might well hesitate to undertake an operation that could draw attention to a possible KGB role in a political assassination.	25X1
	It is not necessary to posit KGB involvement to account for the priest's murder. Sentiment for harsher measures against Solidarity exists within some circles of the Polish party and security forces. A Polish faction could have acted independently to kill the priest in order to scare Solidarity, to cause unrest that would force the government to crack down harder, or to create a complete impasse between the regime and Solidarity elements and thereby undermine Jaruzelski's position and strengthen the hand of hardliners.	25 X 1
	or Soviet Involvement n the other hand, several reasons can be adduced that have impelled the Soviets to seek the priest's death:	
	The Soviets have faulted Jaruzelski for not moving effectively to rebuild the Polish party and for being too accommodating to opposition elements (e.g., Solidarity, the church). They could have believed the murder would be instrumental in reminding Jaruzelski of their ability to create problems for him, in creating an environment that would make his objective of establishing a modus vivendi with the church impossible to achieve, or even in weakening the Polish elite's confidence in his ability to control events and thereby	
		25X1
	-2-	25 X 1

setting the stage for a move against him.	
 The Soviets had publicly raised concerns about the	
activities of Polish church figures. In September 1984, for example, before his abduction and murder, Izvestiya	
had attacked Popieluszko by name as a	
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counterrevolutionary. Since his murder, Soviet media have reiterated the need for the Poles to get tough with	
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

16 November 1984

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attached is a speculative memorandum assessing the possibility of KGB involvement in the murder of the Polish priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko. I have made no further dissemination of this but we plan to send a copy to Matlock, Armacost and Palmer.

Richard J. Kerr Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

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